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ADJUDICATING WHAT YODER LEFT UNRESOLVED:
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS FOR MINOR CHILDREN
AFTER DANFORTH AND CAREY
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,' the Supreme Court held that a school-
attendance law requiring parents to send their children to school
until the age of sixteen violated Amish parents' free exercise of
religion, and infringed their right to direct the religious upbring-
ig of their children.2 Over Justice Douglas' partial dissent,3 the
Court limited its analysis to consideration of the constitutional
rights of the parents as weighed against the state interest in requir-
ig attendance in school, and specifically did not broach the subject
of what constitutionally protected religious rights children might
have distinct from those of their parents.4 The Court decided that
it was unnecessary to consider the possible constitutional rights of
the children because they were not parties to a prosecution of their
parents for failure to send them to school. The case, moreover, did
not involve any attempt by the parents to override their children's
effort to attend school.5 Yoder, therefore, did not answer the ques-
1406 U.S. 205 (1972).
2 Id. 214.
3 [N]o analysis of religious-liberty claims can take place in a vacuum.
If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable
effect is to impose the parents' notions of religious duty upon their children.
Where the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires,
it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an imposition
without canvassing his views. . . . As the child has no other effective
forum, it is in this litigation that his rights should be considered. And, if
an Amish child desires to attend high school, and is mature enough to have
that desire respected the State may well be able to override the parents'
religiously motivated objections.
Id. 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
4 [O]ur holding today in no degree depends on the assertion of the reli-
gious interest of the child as contrasted with that of the parents. It is the
parents who are subject to prosecution here for failing to cause their chil-
dren to attend school, and it is their right of free exercise, not that of their
children, that must determine Wisconsin's power to impose criminal penal-
ties on the parent The dissent [by Justice Douglas] argues that a child
who expresses a desire to attend public high school in conflict with the
wishes of his parents should not be prevented from doing so. There is no
reason for the Court to consider that point since it is not an issue in the
case.
Id. 230-31.
5 The children are not parties to this litigation. The State has at no point
tried this case on the theory that respondents were preventing their chil-
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tion what, if any, constitutionally protected religious rights children
have apart from their parents' free exercise and child rearing rights.
Nevertheless, Justice Douglas did suggest that the determination of
children's religious rights can assume crucial importance, especially
when the child's religious beliefs are at odds with his parents'
dren from attending school against their expressed desires, and indeed the
record is to the contrary. The State's position from the outset has been
that it is empowered to apply its compulsory-attendance law to Amish
parents in the same manner as to other parents--that is, without regard to
the wishes of the child. That is the claim we reject today.
Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible
competing interests of parents, children, and the State in an appropriate
state court proceeding in which the power of the State is asserted on the
theory that Amish parents are preventing their minor children from at-
tending high school despite their expressed desires to the contrary. Recog-
nition of the claim of the State in such a proceeding would, of course,
call into question traditional concepts of parental control over the religious
upbringing and education of their minor children recognized in this Court's
past decisions. It is clear that such an intrusion by a State into family
decisions in the area of religious training would give rise to grave ques-
tions of religious freedom comparable to those raised here and those pre-
sented in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). On this record
we neither reach nor decide those issues.
Id. 231-32 (footnote omitted).
6The Yoder majority is correct in saying that the case could be limited to
balancing parental rights against state interests without looking to any constitutional
rights the children might possess. There was no evidence in the record suggesting
that the children disagreed with their parents. What evidence there was suggested
that they too felt their religious beliefs would be compromised by school attendance.
Because Yoder held only that the parents could not be compelled to send their
children to school, any weight that might have been added on the side of the
parents by considering the children's independent right not to go to school would
have been superfluous. But assume instead that the children did not consider
themselves Amish and wanted to go to public school. Nothing in Yoder prevents
the children from going to school; Yoder holds only that the state cannot force the
parents to send their children to school.
If the parents dissuade or restrain the children from going to school, and thus
force their Amish beliefs on their offspring, there is no violation of the children's
constitutional rights. Even if children possess free exercise rights against state
interference, these rights do not protect them from the private interference of their
parents. See notes 6, 114, 134-36 & accompanying text infra. As the majority
suggests, however, the children might then call upon the state for assistance "in an
appropriate state court proceeding," 406 U.S. at 231, and prevent their parents from
restraining them from going to school. Perhaps it would be decided that, although
Yoder on its facts prevents the state from forcing parents under penalty of law to
send their children to school, the newly-added interest of the children in being free
from-parental imposition of religious beliefs contrary to their own enables the state
to prevent the parents from physically restraining their children from attending
school. Therefore, although Justice Douglas rightly asserts that it might have been
procedurally fairer to have investigated the children's interests in Yoder rather than
to have put the onus on them to start a new proceeding in the event their parents
restrain them from going to school, see id. 244-46, the failure to consider these
possible interests of the children and the exemption of their parents from the
strictures of the school-attendance laws do not infringe on any constitutional right
of the children to be free from state interference with their religious beliefs.
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religious preferences, and the government is involved in such a way
as to trigger a constitutional controversy.7
7 Assuming that the source of children's religious rights is the first amendment's
free exercise clause, state action is required before any interference with children's
religious liberty presents a constitutional problem. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507 (1976). For cases evidencing the contours of the state action
requirement in a context other than the first amendment, see Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). It is,
therefore, crucial to differentiate between a child's liberty interest, e.g. his interest
in being free of parental interference with his religious choices, and the child's
constitutional immunity to government infringement of his free exercise right. The
extent to which the state should, or indeed could, grant protection to juveniles
against their parents' or others' interference with their free exercise right is outside
the scope of this Comment
Determining when the state is involved is of course a question not yet graced
,with a precise answer. Compare Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), with
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See generally Comment,
State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity,
74 COLUm. L. REv. 659 (1974). One commentator suggests that the pervasiveness
of law recognizing parental authority over children might be regarded as translating
into state action any restriction placed by a parent on his child. Burt, Developing
Constitutional Rights of, in, and for Children, 39 L. & Co. =N . Ptou. 118, 137
(Summer 1975). A related but somewhat less fanciful argument is that in certain
cases the failure of the state to act to protect the interest of the child is state action.
For instance, Justice Douglas, dissenting in part in Yoder, seems to suggest that the
state's failure to prevent parents who restrain their children from going to school
from imposing their religious belief upon their children might impinge upon the
children's constitutional rights.
If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable
effect is to impose the parents' notions of religious duty upon their children.
Where the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires,
it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an imposition
without convassing his views.
406 U.S. at 242. See also Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive
Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39 L. & CoNTEin,. PToB. 8, 12 n.13 (Summer
1975):
[W]hen a family is in disintegration or at the threshold of collapse or when
an adolescent persistently seeks complete emancipation and is willing, in
return to relieve his or her parents of reciprocal obligations, then it seems
wrong to exonerate the state of responsibility for such coercive parental
measures as it permits even by its inaction.
Conversely, it has been suggested that when the state is in fact acting there may
sometimes be no state action.
[Aissociational considerations help to establish the boundaries of "state
action" concept in the first instance. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer:
Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962). Thus,
routine cases of parental discipline in an essentially successful family whose
continuation is mutually desired will properly be treated as raising no real
constitutional issue even when the state extends various forms of incidental
support to parental authority; in these cases the state simply should not be
deemed responsible for how such authority is exercised, Nvith the result that
constitutional constraints will not apply.
Id.
Finally, it should be noted that not all constitutional rights are protected
against government alone. The thirteenth amendments prohibition against slavery
is mandatory upon private individuals as well as government. Although it would
be absurd to apply the thirteenth amendment to the ordinary relationship between
1978]
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Although some earlier cases recognized substantive rights of
juveniles, 8 it was not until Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 9 that
the Supreme Court held that minors have constitutionally protected
rights distinct from the rights of their parents. Danforth held that
a statute giving parents an absolute veto over a minor's abortion
decision violated her constitutionally protected privacy rights. The
importance of this holding to any discussion of juveniles' constitu-
tional rights is obvious: if minors possess privacy rights that cannot
be constitutionally delegated, even to parents, they almost certainly
independently possess other substantive rights. Specifically, if chil-
dren are deemed to possess independent privacy rights, is there any
reason not to recognize constitutionally protected religious rights of
children, even in the absence of parental support for these beliefs,
or even in the face of active parental hostility?
If Danforth can be read to extend the blessings of the first
amendment, as well as the privacy right, to juveniles, Yoder becomes
as notable for the questions it has left unanswered as for the ques-
tion it did address. What if the children in Yoder continue to go
to public school against their parents' will? Could the school deny
them entrance? May a child object, on religious grounds, to at-
tendence in a sectarian school in which he has been enrolled by his
parents? If he does, and is truant, or runs away, may his parents
enlist the aid of the state in securing his submission?'0 Alterna-
tively, may avowedly secular parents obtain state assistance in de-
taching their child from a fundamentalist group or mystical sect? 11
parent and child, in an extreme case perhaps this amendment could become ap-
plicable. "Once a person is capable of survival away from home and insists, after
sustained reflection, upon a complete break, to permit his or her parents to hold on
arguably shares most of the characteristics of enslavement rather than those of
voluntary association." Id. See also note 101 infra.
8 See text accompanying notes 55-63 infra.
9428 U.S. 52 (1976).
10 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West 1972): ("Any person
under the age of 18 years who persistently or habitually refuses to obey the reason-
able and proper orders or directives of his parents . . or who is beyond the
control of such person . . . is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which
may adjudge such a person to be a ward of the court."); N.J. STAT. A N. § 2A:4-45
(West Supp. 1977); Omo REv. CoDE AN. § 2151.022 (Page 1976).
11 Recently, certain religious groups have sought to detach children from their
parents. They are not altogether without religious authority in this effort. See,
e.g., Luke 14:26 (King James): "If any man come to me, and hate not his father,
and mother . . . he cannot be my disciple." This religiously based splintering of
the famliy unit raises interesting legal issues, but the cases so far have dealt with
adult children, and the parents interest in child-rearing, therefore, has not been fully
tested. See, e.g., Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F. Supp. 603 (D.C. Vt.
1977).
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What result in "medical cases" when the child's religious attitudes
toward blood transfusions or surgery clash with those of his par-
ents? 1 2 What weight should be accorded the child's religious pref-
erence if religion is a major issue in a custody battle? 13 If these
questions involve two distinct constitutional rights-a free exercise
right of the child and a free exercise-child raising right of the
parent-can the state ever attempt to provide an answer without
violating the Constitution?
This Comment will explore the contours of intra-family free
exercise conflicts in the light of Yoder and Danforth. First it will
examine the history and present status of the parental right to
supervise religious upbringing. Next it will turn to the questions
of the existence, nature and scope of a right of freedom of religion
for minors. Finally it will suggest what accommodation is possible
if both rights are to be respected and the state is to avoid the diffi-
cult, undesirable, and almost certainly unconstitutional regulation
of matters of family and religious conscience.
II. THE PARENTAL INTEREST IN THE CHILD'S RELIGIOUS UPBRINGING
A. At Common Law
There has been a remarkable historical evolution in the rights
of parents to determine the upbringing of their children. Mid-
sixteenth century English history is largely centered on the struggle
between an emerging Protestantism and the older Roman Catholic
order.14 During the reign of Elizabeth, the Protestants gained the
ascendency, and one of the Elizabethan reforms was the passage of
repressive religious statutes.'5 Aimed at securing the triumph of
Protestantism, these enactments circumscribed the authority of
parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children.
Many of the statutes sought to accomplish this by interfering
with the ability of Roman Catholic parents to educate their chil-
dren in Roman Catholic schools. In 1590, the Elizabethans enacted
a statute requiring schoolmasters to adhere to the Established
12 These cases can arise when either parent or child is a Christian Scientist or
Jehovah's Witness, perhaps the two best known religious groups opposed to certain
medical practices. For a discussion of the conflicts possible in these cases, see text
accompanying notes 111-15, 147-51 infra.
a Custody cases involving religious issues are not uncommon, and the views
of the child are often taken into account. See generally text accompanying notes
106-10, 152 infra.
14 See Friedman, The Parental Right to Control the Religious Education of a
Child, 29 Hanv. L. REv. 485 (1916).
15 Id. 485.
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church.' In the years which followed, this measure was supple-
mented by another enactment which made it a crime for a Roman
Catholic parent to send his child abroad for a Catholic education;
another law imposed perpetual imprisonment on any Roman
Catholic who maintained a school or otherwise sought to educate
young people. 7 ,
The eighteenth century saw a gradual relaxation of these stric-
tures, as Protestantism became more entrenched and secure.' 8 Al-
though the statutes themselves remained on the books, they began
to be given a more liberal interpretation. 9 By the early 1800's the
English bench was quite willing to look with equal favor on all
religions in family matters.20  Thus, the state's control over religious
upbringing was gradually loosened, and was replaced by rules of
law that vested control in the father.2 ' This doctrine of religio
sequitur patrem is illustrated by the words of the judge in In re
Newton:
22
In no case ... that I am aware of, where the father has
been alive, has the court disregarded his wishes concerning
the religious education of his children, unless . . .he has
been himself a man so ill-conditioned and of such bad
conduct that the court thought fit altogether to deprive
him of the custody of his children.
23
The rationale for the rule lay simply in the fact that "the father is
the head of the household, exercising the absolute right and under-
1' Id.
17Id. Nor were Roman Catholic parents always trusted in their own homes.
Thus in Teynham v. Lennard, 4 Bro. P.C. 302, 2 Eng. Rep. 204 (1724), the Lord
Chancellor, complying with the request of the paternal grandfather of a seven-year-
old child, ordered that a Roman Catholic widow be denied custody of her child.
Although the mother was raising him as a Protestant in accordance with the wishes
of her late husband, the Chancellor feared that the "Papist" mother might instill
"the principles of that religion into the infant," and thus gave custody to a person
recommended by the grandfather.
18 Friedman, supra note 14, at 487.
19 Blackstone was able to write in 1765:
[Wihat foreigners who only judge from our statute-book are not fully
apprized of [is] that these laws are seldom exerted to their utmost rigor:
and, indeed if they were, it would be very difficult to excuse them. For
they are rather to be accounted for from their history, and the urgency of
the times which produced them, then to be approved . . . as a standing
system of law.
4 W. BrAcKsoNE, Co Nau=AMus *57.
2 0 See, e.g., Lyons v. Blenkin, Jac. 245, 37 Eng. Rep. 842 (1821).
21 Friedman, supra note 14, at 488-89.
22 L.R. 1 Ch. 740 (1865).
23 Id. 748.
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taking the responsibility nature gave him through the birth of the
child, for the interest of the child, the family and the public wel-
fare." 2A4 It was an inflexible rule and its application often brought
about absurd results.2 5 But it was a convenient rule as well, and
it remained in full force in England until the passage of the Guard-
ianship of Infants Act of 1925.28 That act abrogated the common
law rule, and with its passage courts were instructed to decide family
matters involving children with "the welfare of the infant as the
first and paramount consideration." 
2 7
Although the Guardianship of Infants Act changed the legal
standard to be applied in cases involving the religious beliefs of
children, the result was often the same as under the doctrine of
religio sequitur patrem, for the courts assumed that the "best interest
of the child" would be effectuated by vindicating the religious views
of the father without consideration of the child's religious prefer-
ences. Thus in Todd v. Lyons,28 the Vice Chancellor ordered the
superior of a monastery to refrain from admitting a young man of
seventeen to monastic vows against the father's consent, and ordered
that the minor be delivered back to the father immediately. In a
second English case, Iredell v. Iredell,2 9 decided in 1885, the court
granted an injunction restraining certain persons from further com-
municating with a young girl. It appears that they had been sur-
reptitiously meeting with her, trying to convince her to abandon
her rather's religion in favor of theirs3c
In the United States, government has never compelled parents
to educate their children according to the tenets of any particular
faith, as had once been the case in England.3' Although some
24 Comment, Parents' Right to Prescribe Religious Education of Children, 3
DE PAuL L. REv. 83, 84 (1953).
25 Thus, except where the father had forfeited control, it was preserved even
after his death, and courts were not hesistant to force a widowed mother to raise
her children according to a religion contrary to her own. See Hawksworth v.
Hawksworth, L.R. 6 Oh. 539, 539-40 (1871).
26Where in any proceeding before any court . . . the custody or up-
bringing of an infant . . . is in question, the court, in deciding that
question, shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount
consideration, and shall not take into consideration . . . the claim of the
father, or any right at common law possessed by the father . . . superior
to that of the mother....
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c.45, § 1.
27 Id.
28 Unreported. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 497 & n.43.
29 1 Times L.R. 260 (1885).
SO Id. 261.
-1 See Friedman, supra note 14, at 497.
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jurisdictions have followed the religio sequitur partrem doctrine,32
most American jurisdictions adopted instead the "best interest of
the child" standard of the Guardianship Act.
3
As was the practice in England, however, it has been all but
an irrebuttable presumption that the best interest of the child was
most effectively accomplished by upholding the father's preferences
for religious upbringing without regard to the child's preference in
the matter. Thus the "best interest" standard in religious matters
was often indistinguishable in the United States from religio sequi-
tur patrem.14 Moreover, when the courts did intervene in the
religious affairs of minors it was most often to prevent an "officious
intermeddler" from interfering with parental authority. Thus in
Prieto v. St. Alphonsus Convent of Mercy, 5 the Supreme Court of
Louisiana ordered a convent to expel a seventeen-year-old girl who
had entered it to become a nun. The girl's widowed mother had
never consented to her daughter's decision, and now adamantly ob-
jected. In sustaining the writ of habeas corpus brought by the
mother, the court did not consider the daughter's religious prefer-
ences, and did not raise the possibility that the daughter had any
independent right to exercise her religious beliefs.
Even when, under the "best interest" standard, the parents'
child-rearing preferences in the area of religion occasionally were
held not to control, the "best interest" approach to resolving reli-
gious questions concerning children did not include considerations
of the child's own religious preferences.36
3 2
1n an early New York case, a guardian was ordered to raise his ward
according to the religious beliefs of the natural father even though those beliefs
were inconsistent with the guardian's religious beliefs.
33 See Boerger v. Boerger, 26 N.J. Super. 90, 97 A.2d 419 (Ch. Div. 1953);
Cory v. Cory, 70 Cal. App. 2d 563, 161 P.2d 385 (1945); Purinton v. Jamrock-,
195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907).
34 See Friedman, supra note 14, at 498-99.
The "best interests of the child" were also beginning to be protected in other
areas of the law by the late 1800's, and in these areas the needs of the child were
receiving greater protecti6n. The first child abuse case, for example, was reported
in New York City in 1875. See, Grumet, The Plaintive Plaintiffs: Victims of the
Battered Child Syndrome, in THE YOUNGEST MINonrrY (S. Katz ed. 1974).
8552 La. Ann. 631, 27 So. 153 (1900).
36 See, e.g., Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907), where
the mother of an illegitimate child attempted to block an adoption order that would
have awarded the child to adoptive parents of a different religious faith. The court,
while recognizing that children should be placed with adoptive parents of the
same religious faith when "reasonably practicable," stressed that its paramount duty
was to consult "the welfare of the child." Id. at 199-200, 80 N.E. at 804-05.
In this case, the "best interests" required that the child be given over to the adoptive
parents despite the fact that they were of a different religious faith.
[Vol. 126:1135
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS FOR MINOR CHILDREN
B. Constitutional Protection
By a series of Supreme Court decisions, the common law right
of parents to direct their children's upbringing has been enshrined
as a constitutional right. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,37 the Su-
preme Court held that the liberty element of the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause includes "the liberty of parents . . . to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their con-
trol" and that an Oregon law requiring every child to attend public
school violated that right.38 Although the Court spoke of parental
rights generally and did not specifically address parents' rights to
oversee their children's religious development, the ultimate issue
in the case was the right of parents to send their children to a
Roman Catholic school in lieu of public school.39 In Prince v.
37268 U.S. 510 (1925).
38 Id. 534-35. Two years earlier in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),
the Court had held a statute forbidding the teaching of the German language to
young children violative of the fourteenth amendment, declaring:
Without doubt, . . . [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.
Id. 399.
In the years following Meyer and Pierce, the Court repudiated the substantive
due process analysis on which those cases were based, see Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423, 425 (1952); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236,
245-47 (1941); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial in AzrmumcA CoNsvrruToNAL LAW 155 (L. Levy ed.
1966), but their spirit lived on and they were both reinterpreted in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as first amendment cases. Griswold found
unconstitutional a Connecticut statute which made it unlawful to use contraceptives.
In discussing prior cases that had delineated the parameters of the constitutional
provisions involved in the instant case, the Court, per Justice Douglas, ascribed
"[tlhe right to educate a child in a school of the parents choice" to the first amend-
ment. Id. 482. Justice Stewart, dissenting in the Court's earlier decision in
Abington' School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 312 (1963), had argued that
"'[i]t has become accepted that the decision in Pierce . . . upholding the right
of parents to send their children to nonpublic schools, was ultimately based upon
the recognition of the validity of the free exercise claim involved in that situation."
39 Although the law in question made it a misdemeanor for parents to fail to
send their children to public school, the suit was brought by a Catholic school,
268 U.S. at 530-32. The Court held that the mandatory public school attendance
was an "arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful interference with [the schoors] busi-
ness and property." Id. 536. The school had alleged that the law infringes upon
"the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate
mental and religious training." Id. 532. The school argued in part: "In this day
and under our civilization the child of man is his parents' child and not the State's.
. . . It is not seriously debatable that the parental right to guide one's child
intellectually and religiously is a most substantial part of the liberty of the parent."
Id. 518 (argument of appellant).
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Mlfassachusetts,40 although upholding the power of the state to pre-
vent a guardian from allowing a child under her control to distribute
religious literature,41 the Court recognized the constitutional rights
of "parents to give [children] religious training and to encourage
them in the practice of religious belief." 42
When the Court confronted the claims of the Amish parents in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,43 it took the opportunity to restate and support
this view. Although the parents did not object to elementary edu-
cation, they believed that sending their children to high school
would expose the children to worldly ways and thereby endanger
their own and their children's salvation.44 In freeing the parents
from that part of the Wisconsin compulsory education law requir-
ing them to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade,
the Supreme Court read Pierce as "a charter of the rights of parents
to direct the religious upbringing of their children." 45 Chief
Justice Burger announced that the case involved "the fundamental
interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the
religious future and education of their children."46 He then went
on to declare that "the history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and
upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in
the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate
as an enduring American tradition." 47 Thus, where "nothing more
than the general interest of the parent in the nurture and education
of his children is involved," the Court would allow the state to
intervene if the intervention were reasonably likely to foster the
child's health, safety or welfare.48 Where, however, "the interests
of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim,"49 more
than just a "reasonable relation to some purpose within the compe-
tency of the state" would be required to justify intrusion by the
state.50 Only when it appeared that parental decisions would "jeop-
ardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for
40321 U.S. 158 (1944).
41Id. 170.
42 Id. 165.
48406 U.S. 205 (1972).
44 Id. 209.
45 Id. 233.
46 Id. 232.
47Id.
48 Id. 233.
49 Id.
5Old., quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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significant social burdens," would the power of the parent, linked to
a free exercise claim, be subject to limitation under Prince.51
When viewed with the common law's acceptance of parental
control over the child's religious indoctrination,5 2 the Yoder hold-
ing, with its interpretation of the line of cases from Pierce through
Prince, might be read as establishing that the first amendment's free
exercise provisions vest in the parents a constitutionally-protected
right to direct their child's religious upbringing in the absence of
any compelling reason for state interference.53 Thus the common
law standard of "best interest of the child," with its presumption
that those interests can best be served without governmental inter-
ference, has been incorporated in the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, with the result that the state may not circumscribe parental
discretion in religious matters unless some palpable harm would
otherwise befall the child.
54
III. TowARus CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECrED RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
A. Rights Emerging
Although there is language in Prince v. Massachusetts"' that
suggests children have constitutional religious rights, the Supreme
Court has never held that these rights are anything more tharn an
aspect of the religious liberty of parents. Thus Pierce, Prince and
Yoder cannot be read as recognizing that children have religious
rights distinct from their parents' religious rights. On the other
hand, these cases do not stand for the proposition that such an inde-
pendent right does not exist. In Pierce the issue of the children's
51 Id. 234.
52 See text accompanying notes 22-34 supra.
53 It should also be noted that the parents' interest in the religious upbringing
of their children has been implicitly recognized in a number of the establishment
clause cases brought by parents seeking to bar religious instruction in public schools
attended by their child. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
54 Even before Yoder some courts had read Pierce, Prince or the common law
effectively to establish a constitutional right of parents to direct their children's
religious upbringing. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Faust, 239 Miss. 299, 123
So. 2d 218 (1960). In that case the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed a chancery
court decree that had ordered the father of two teenage boys to leave them in a
public school and to permit them to attend the church of their own choice.
55 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944). The Court noted that the right of children
to exercise their religion had been recognized in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), and that the child's right to receive religious
training as having been sustained in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925). Barnette upheld a religiously-based refusal of public school children to
salute the flag.
1978] 1145
1146 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
religious beliefs was passed over by the Court.58 In Prince the child
testified that her religious beliefs were in accord with those of her
guardian.57 And in Yoder the Court avoided the issue by declaring
that the parents' constitutional rights alone were sufficient to out-
weigh the state's interest.58 In none of these cases was the specifica-
tion of the child's religious preference a necessary element of the
adjudication, nor was there any indication that the views of the
children were not in accord with their parents' religious preferences.
That the Court's emphasis in these cases should be on the
parental rights is understandable, for it was the parents who were
subject to prosecution. But an examination of the cases in which
the issue of children's constitutional rights came to the fore reveals
a similar ambiguity between juvenile and parental rights. Indeed,
in no case before Danforth did the Supreme Court explicitly hold
that juveniles have substantive rights independent of their parents.59
Thus, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,6" which held that public schools unduly infringed
56 The school had argued that the statute, inter alia, infringed the "right of the
child to influence the parents' choice of a [religious] school," 268 U.S. at 532, but
the Court did not address this argument.
57 321 U.S. at 162-63.
58 406 U.S. at 230-31. One of the children, however, did testify that her
religious beliefs were in accord with those of her parents. Id. 231 n.21.
59 In the procedural arena, however, the Supreme Court has maintained that
juveniles have considerable rights. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967), the
Court held that juveniles in the adjudicatory stage of delinquency proceedings that
may lead to commitment to a state institution must be guaranteed the constitutional
rights of notice, counsel, confrontation and cross examination of witnesses, as well
as the privilege against self-incrimination. Subsequently, in In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970), the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was extended
to such juvenile adjudication. Recently, the prohibition against double jeopardy,
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), and procedural due process in a civil con-
text, Gross v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), were made applicable to juveniles. See
aso Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (extending the protection against
coerced confessions to juveniles); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). But see
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), holding that although corporal punish-
ment of students in public schools implicates "a constitutionally protected liberty
interest," no further process is due beyond the presently available state law remedies.
Id. 672.
It is interesting to note that even in the procedural sphere it is not clear that
the child's right is distinct from that of his parents, and if so just where the dis-
tinction lies. For example, in recognizing procedural rights for juveniles in Gault,
the Court appeared to be protecting the interests of the parents in the "liberty" of
the child in addition to the interests of the child himself. Thus, the Court in
Cault stressed that the rights to notice and counsel belonged to both parent and
child, because the parent's custody of the child was also at stake. In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1967).
60 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Note that the parents brought the suit on behalf
of their children. Id. 504. For a case in which a child brought suit against the
school board over the opposition of his parents, see Buckholz v. Leveille, 37 Mich.
App. 166, 194 N.W.2d 427 (1971).
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upon students' first amendment rights by disciplining them for
wearing black armbands in protest against the Vietnam War, the
Court noted the existence of parental consent to the wearing of
black armbands. In Ginsberg v. New York,"' in upholding a law
that banned the sale of obscene literature to children-literature
that clearly could not have been considered obscene for adults
-the Court justified this lesser first amendment protection given
juveniles on the ground that the state was vindicating the parents'
interest in determining their children's reading material.
3
On the other hand, in discussing these substantive rights the
Court often focused on the deprivation of the rights of the children
themselves. Thus, in Tinker the Court declared that "[s]tudents in
school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution.
They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must
respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the
State." 64 More recently, in Goss v. Lopez,65 which required that
a child be given a due process hearing before he can be suspended
from school, the Court discussed the child's substantive rights that
the hearing would protect:
[Suspension] is a serious event in the life of the suspended
child. Neither the property interest in educational
benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in repu-
tation, which is also implicated, is so insubstantial that
suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any pro-
cedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.60
B. Children's Independent Privacy Rights
It would be idle to argue that these cases establish an inde-
pendent free exercise right for children whose parents actively
oppose their religious preferences. However, two recent Supreme
61390 U.S. 629 (1968).
62 Id. 634-35.
63 Id. 639.
64 393 U.S. at 511.
05 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
66 Id. 576 (footnote omitted). But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977) (paddling of students in public school as corporal punishment not violative
of eighth amendment prohibition against Cruel and Unusual punishment, even if
punishment is so excessive as to severely injure the child).
Substantive constitutional interests have also been recognized by lower courts
when a parent attempts to commit the child to a mental institution against the
child's will. See J. L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976), prob. juris.
noted, 431 U.S. 936 (1977); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1939 (E.D. Pa.
1975), prob. juris. noted, 424 U.S. 964 (1976), dismissed as moot, - U.S. -
(1977). See also Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
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Court cases, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 'I and Carey v. Popu-
lation Services International,68 do lend support to such an argument.
In Danforth, the Court was asked to test the constitutionality of a
Missouri statute that, as part of a complex scheme of abortion regu-
lation, imposed "a blanket provision.., requiring the consent of a
parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an
unmarried minor during the first twelve weeks of her pregnancy." 69
In striking down the provision the Court declared, "[c] onstitutional
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults,
are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights." 70 The Court concluded that "the State does not have the
constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto" over a minor's constitutionally protected
privacy right to make the abortion decision in consultation with her
physician.7
1
The Court rejected both the district court's view that there
was a "compelling basis" for the statute in the state's interest
"in safeguarding the authority of the family relationship," 72 and
the state's argument that the statute vindicated the parental right
to direct the upbringing of the child. The state had urged that the
law "properly may subject minors to more stringent limitations than
are permissible with respect to adults," especially where the limita-
tions are on decisions that "are outside the scope of a minor's ability
409 U.S. 1076 (1972), in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit voided the mandatory chapel attendance rules of federal military academies.
With one circuit judge dissenting, the court held that the regulations were invalid
under the establishment clause, with Chief Judge Bazelon stating that the regulations
also violated the student's free exercise rights. The plaintiffs here were not parents
of students, but the students themselves. Id. 284. The regulations, while per-
mitting a cadet or midshipman to be excused for conscientious objection to church
or chapel attendance, were otherwise unequivocal, id. nn.3 & 5, and permitted the
student to change his regular attendance only after he had received permission
from "the respective chaplains involved and from his parents if he [was] under
twenty-one." Id. 284. In reaching its conclusion on the establishment issue, the
court effectively extended the first amendments religious guarantees to minors who
were manifesting their preferences independently of their parents. Thus, there can
be no asserting that the court in this instance was adjudicating the parent's rights
on behalf of the children. The decision did, however, rest on establishment rather
than free exercise grounds.
67428 U.S. 52 (1976).
6s 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
69 428 U.S. at 74.
70 Id. (footnotes omitted).
71 Id. The constitutionally protected privacy right in the abortion context was
recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973).
72 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 352 F. Supp. 1362, 1370 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
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to act in his own best interest." 78 The state had also argued that
it was proper to delegate the authority to make those decisions to
the parents in light of the Court's previous recognition of parental
discretion in child raising.74 The Court was unpersuaded, however,
finding it "difficult . . . to conclude that providing a parent with
absolute power to overrule a determination, made by the physician
and his minor patient, to terminate the patient's pregnancy will
serve to strengthen the family unit." 71 The Court also found it
unlikely that such veto power would "enhance parental authority or
control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so funda-
mentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy already
has fractured the family structure." 76 If the parent had any inde-
pendent interest in preventing the termination of the minor daugh-
ter's pregnancy, it is "no more weighty than the right of privacy of
the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant." 7T
Having determined that a privacy right for minors exists dis-
tinct from parental rights, and, at least to some extent, that it may
be exercised independent of parental permission, the Danforth
Court went on to address the scope of that right. The primary fault
with Missouri's parental consent requirement was that it gave "a
third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" over the
minor's decision without sufficient justification.78 The Court
stressed that its holding did not intend that "every minor, regard-
less of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of
her pregnancy." 70
In a concurring opinion, in which he argued that the statute's
"primary constitutional deficiency [lay] in its imposition' of an
absolute limitation on the minor's right to obtain an abortion," s
Justice Stewart emphasized the limited scope of the holding:
[A] materially different constitutional issue would be pre-
sented under a provision requiring parental consent or
consultation . . . but providing for prompt . . . judicial
resolution of any disagreement between the parent and the
minor, or . . . judicial determination that the minor is
mature enough to give an informed consent without
73 428 U.S. at 72.
74 Id. 73.
75 Id. 75.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. 74.
79 Id. 75.
80 Id. 90 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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parental concurrence or that abortion in any event is in
the minor's best interest.8 '
In such a case, the state would be furthering the constitutionally
permissible end of encouraging pregnant minors to seek the help
and advice of their parents in making the child-bearing decision.m
That Danforth does not absolutely foreclose the parents of
minor children from participating in the abortion decision was
also made clear in the companion case of Bellotti v. Baird. 3 In
that case the Court considered a Massachusetts statute that re-
quired parental consent to the abortion decision in most instances
but also provided for judicial review in the event permission were
denied 4 The Court unanimously vacated and remanded for certi-
fication to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts the ques-
tion of the proper construction of the statute. Abstention was
mandated because the statute was "susceptible of a construction by
the state judiciary, 'which might avoid in whole or in part the
necessity for federal constitutional adjudication or at least materially
change the nature of the problem.'" 5 The Court stressed that it
was "concerned with a statute directed toward minors, as to whom
there are unquestionably greater risks of inability to give an in-
formed consent." S The Court suggested that a statute requiring
only parental consultation would materially change the nature of
the problem encountered in Danforth.
87
The scope of the substantive rights enjoyed by minors was
further clarified in Carey v. Population Services International.88
81 Id. 90-91.
82Id. 91.
83428 U.S. 132 (1976).
84 The statute provided in part that:
If one or both of the mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may
be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause shown,
after such hearing as he deems necessary.
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12p(1) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974).
85 Id. 147, quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959).
86 Id.
87 Id. The Court hinted at a construction that would save the statute:
The picture thus painted by the respective appellants is of a statute that
prefers parental consultation and consent, but that permits a mature minor
capable of giving informed consent to obtain, without undue burden, an
order permitting the abortion without parental consultation, and, further,
permits even a minor incapable of giving informed consent to obtain an
order without parental consultation where there is a showing that the
abortion would be in her best interests. The statute, as thus read, would
be fundamentally different from a statute that creates a "parental veto."
Id. 145 (footnote omitted).
88 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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In Carey the Court was faced with a challenge to a New York statute
which, inter alia, prohibited the sale or distribution of contraceptives
to minors under the age of sixteen.89 A plurality of the Court 90
concluded that the right of privacy in connection with decisions
affecting procreation, made applicable to minors in Danforth, in-
cluded a right to be free from blanket prohibitions against distribu-
tion of contraceptives and thus declared the New York law uncon-
stitutional.91 In so doing, the plurality viewed Danforth as holding
that the state could interfere with constitutional privacy rights of
minors on a lesser showing than the compelling state interest test
which is applied to the constitutional rights of adults,92 but that
state restrictions "inhibiting privacy rights of minors are valid only
if they serve 'any significant state interest.., that is not present in
the case of an adult.' "93 The plurality suggested that
"[s]uch lessser scrutiny is appropriate [for regulation of
the constitutional rights of minors] both because of the
States' greater latitude to regulate the conduct of children
... and because the right of privacy implicated here is 'the
89The statute also prohibited distribution of contraceptives to those over
sixteen by anyone other than a licensed pharmacist, and additionally banned display
of contraceptives. N-w YonK EnucAnoN LAw § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972).
9OJustice Brennan wrote the opinion and was joined by Justices Stewart,
Marshall, and Blackmun in that portion relating to the right of minors to obtain
contraceptives. Justices White, Powell, and Stevens, in separate opinions, concurred
in the parts of the opinion concerning the other provisions of the statute, but
concurred only in the result of the part of the opinion striking down the ban on
distribution of contraceptives to minors.
Justice White based his concurrence primarily on the fact that the state had
"not demonstrated that the prohibition against distribution of contraceptives to
minors measurably contributes to the deterrent purposes which the State advances
as justification for the restriction." 431 U.S. at 702 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Powell's concurring opinion attacked the New York statute for infringing
on the privacy interests of married females between the ages of fourteen and sixteen,
and for prohibiting parents from distributing contraceptives to their children.
Id. 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring). He indicated that a statute "requiring minors
to seek parental guidance would be consistent with . . . prior cases." Id. 709.
Justice Stevens concurred, but rather than stressing the constitutional right of the
child to contraceptives, Stevens emphasized the interest of states in protecting
young persons against the harmful consequences of unwise choices. Id. 714
(Stevens, J., concurring). Thus Justice Stevens found that a state could legitimately
seek to protect minors from potentially harmful effects of sexual intercourse.
What made the New York statute invalid as a protective measure, however, was
the fact that it served to punish minors while protecting them. For by denying
contraceptives to minors it exposed them to intolerably high risks of venereal
disease. Id. 715.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist filed dissenting opinions.
91 Id. 691-98.
92 Id. 693 & n.15.
93 Id. 693, quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)
(emphasis added).
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interest in independence in making certain kinds of im-
portant decisions' . .. and the law has generally regarded
minors as having a lesser capability for making important
decisions." 94
The conclusions reached by the Supreme Court in Danforth
and Carey strongly suggest that minor, unemancipated children have
constitutionally protected religious rights, distinct from the religious
rights of their parents, that can be exercised independent of parental
approval. This follows not only from the Court's ultimate recog-
nition of substantive privacy rights that inure to children, but also
from the mode of analysis used by the Court in arriving at its con-
clusions. Both Danforth and Carey established first that minors
possess a constitutional right to privacy and then proceeded to
delineate the scope of that right. Although both Carey and Dan-
forth declared that the state need not show compelling reasons to
validly inhibit minors' privacy rights, the statement that restrictions
on these rights are "valid only if they serve [a] significant state
interest . . that is not present in the case of an adult" 95 necessarily
implies that the proper analysis of a minor's claim to a constitutional
right must begin with a recognition that the minor enjoys the con-
stitutional right in question. The state then must show that it has
some "significant" interest arising from conditions related to child-
hood that provides constitutional justification for limitation of the
right in question.
Carey thus declares that childhood is not a talisman that auto-
matically justifies nullification of constitutional liberties; rather, if
a state seeks to regulate the activities of children-activities which if
engaged in by adults would be constitutionally protected-the state
must point to some demonstrable characteristic of childhood that
gives rise to a significant state interest in regulation beyond that
which could constitutionally be imposed on adults. Danforth holds,
moreover, that constitutional liberties possessed by children are, at
least in part, rights that children can exercise independently of their
94Id. 693 n.15, citing Prince v. Massachusetts and Ginsberg v. New York.
In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944), the Court stated "the power
of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its
authority over adults. ... ." See text accompanying notes 101-03 & n.103 supra.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), upheld the constitutionality of a New
York statute prohibiting the sale of certain sexually explicit literature to children.
Although this material was concededly not obscene for adults, the Court neverthe-
less allowed the state to ban the sale to juveniles, as to whom it was found to be
obscene. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
95 431 U.S. at 693, quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
75 (1976).
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parents and that cannot be delegated in a way that gives parents an
arbitrary veto over these rights.
C. Abortion v. Religion
If Danforth and Carey suggest that children possess, albeit to a
lesser extent, the constitutional rights of adults, they can not be
said to establish a broad range of constitutional protection. The
Court has been willing to find a right to privacy for minors encom-
passing their determination of questions raised by birth control and
abortion; it might be less willing to find other rights. It seems
prudent to ask, then, whether there is any justifiable distinction
between the protected abortion decision and the as yet doubtful
free exercise right.
Initially it can be argued that the reasons for extending free
exercise rights to children are not as compelling as the justifications
offered for extending rights to minors in the abortion context. The
abortion decision is by its very nature a life decision which must be
made immediately. It can affect the child's life for years to come,
well into the time when the child becomes an adult. In this respect
the decision can have grave affects on the child's adult life, and
therefore the view that the child should be accorded the right to
participate in the decision seems particularly compelling. In addi-
tion, the .view that honors the minor's position on the abortion
decision is consistent with the position that minors should be pro-
tected from shouldering certain adult responsibilities such as mar-
riage, work and contractual obligations.96 When a minor requests
an abortion over parental objection, the minor is often indicating
that the child-bearing experience will be harmful to her develop-
ment-that she is seeking to avoid the trauma and responsibility of
an unwanted pregnancy. 97 If the policy is that minors should be
able to avoid duties that they would otherwise be obliged to
fulfill, a parental right to veto the child's abortion decision is con-
trary to the law's policy, because it forces the minor to acquire the
tremendous responsibility of nurturing a child.
It can be argued that none of these considerations apply with
respect to the free exercise of religion. These decisions may not be
life decisions, and can perhaps be postponed without causing signi-
ficant harm until the child reaches the age of majority. Arguably,
96 See note 103 infra.
97 See Comment, The Validity of Parental Consent Statutes after Planned
Parenthood. 54 U. DFT. J. UnB. L. 127, 144 (1976).
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these temporary limitations upon religious free expression do not
represent permanent deprivations.
This argument is appealing to those with a completely secular
outlook. Our secular culture is inclined to consider life crises, such
as pregnancy and childbirth, to be more vital and immediate to a
minor than her relationship with God. Even when the pregnancy
is over, and the responsibility of raising an infant is avoided through
adoption, it is undeniable that the psychological and social burden
on the juvenile mother is severe. It is not surprising, however, that
religious persons, adult or minor, would almost certainly disagree
with this value judgment. Interference with religious conscience,
observance, and expression strikes at the first and central value of
the believer. God comes first, and the believer's relationship with
his God can not be delayed, tempered, or ignored. The values
reflected in any decision to offer the abortion decision greater pro-
tection than the religious decision are those of a society that has
concluded that the religious decision does not really mean what
it says it means.
Moreover, such a value judgment flys in the face of the ordering
of the Constitution itself. The "privacy" right is nowhere mentioned,
although now firmly, if only recently, established. The free exer-
cise right is a first amendment right and lies at the heart of the most
fundamental values of the Constitution's framers. For while abor-
tion is primarily a matter of convenience, free exercise is a matter
of conscience, and if the Constitution extends the former to any
of our citizens, it is hard to believe it does not extend the latter.
But even if one is philosophically unconvinced that the value of
free exercise is the equal of the privacy right to terminate a preg-
nancy, the immediacy and importance of the decision protected in
Danforth are not, even by the most secular cost-benefit approach,
greater than the immediacy and importance of certain religious
decisions. Compare the impact on the minor in Danforth, if her
parents were allowed to veto her abortion, with the impact on the
children in Yoder if they rejected their parents religious views but
were still denied an education pursuant to a state policy supporting
the constitutionally protected parental decision. The former must
endure a full pregnancy and bear the child; then she can presumably
give it up for adoption. Although the social and psychological
impact of this experience should not be underestimated, the impact
on the Yoder child is surely greater if his religious views are subju-
gated, with the assistance of the state, to those of his parents. Ie
must sacrifice, at least for a time, his education, and, not coinci-
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dentally, his chances for higher education and a professional career.
True, he might "catch up," but this is unlikely at best, and involves
at least as much pain as the Danforth minor would endure through
a nine month pregnancy.
Finally the two rights, privacy and free exercise, are so closely
related as to make any distinction here doubtful at best. The
privacy concept ennunciated by the court in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,98 Roe v. Wade 99 and in Meyers and Pierce is based on a right
of personal autonomy in the making of certain fundamental choices
which guide one's destiny-autonomy which is particularly impor-
tant for young people in their developmental stage. The first
amendment is premised on a belief that regimentation of mind and
spirit blocks the advancement of knowledge and the discovery of
truth; 100 state regulation or state-sanctioned parental interference
that intrudes on areas of belief and puts undue restrictions on spirit-
ual development is inimical to these important developmental
values. The rights protected by the first amendment are focused
on the same values of individual autonomy and liberty that lie at
the heart of the less specific right to privacy. A distinction between
the two thus seems peculiar at best.
A second argument for denying juveniles independent religious
rights despite Danforth and Carey is that minors lack the level of
intellectual and emotional maturity that is prerequisite to the mean-
ingful exercise of religious rights.10 1 Ginsberg v. New York, which
98381 U.S. 479 (1965).
99 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100T. EMERsoN, THm Ssmi ov FREEDOm OF ExPRxssIoN 6-7 (1970).
101 There is now considerable evidence to the effect that adolescents possess
the intellectual capacity necessary for the meaningful exercise of first amendment
religious rights. During adolescence, children show "a widened capacity for abstract
concept formation and for the ability to judge and reason." M. POLLARD & B.
GEOGOEGAN, Tim GROWING CHILD Ix CONTEmpORARY SocrETy 298 (1969). This
is due to the qualitative development of the adolescent's cognitive skills, which
appears to begin around age eleven or twelve. See Piaget, The Intellectual Develop-
ment of the Adolescent, in ADoLEscENCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 22-24 (G.
Caplan & S. Lebovici eds. 1969). It is then that the "capacity of reasoning on
hypotheses" begins, that is reasoning "on the basis of propositions, which are not
taken as true or false, but are experimentally formulated in order to derive from
them all possible consequences, which are then checked by comparison to the facts."
Id. 23-24. For Piaget, this new ability to think abstractly and critically, and to
judge in terms of values and past experiences is what enables the adolescent to
"achieve his integration into the social relationships of adults." Id. at 25. Accord-
ing to Elkind, this cognitive development is nearly complete by age sixteen, and
the concept-forming and problem-solving abilities which the adolescent has devel-
oped remain with him throughout his life. See Elkind, Egocentrism in Adoles-
cence, 38 Camp DEv. 1025, 1032 (1967).
As intellectual development progresses, and the child's ability to form abstract
concepts and reason increases, he is also able to attain "mature and integrated
moral behavior based on sound principles." M. PoLLARm & B. GEoGnECAr, supra,
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allowed the state to ban the sale of certain literature to minors,
recognized that in many situations minors are incapable of making
rational, mature and informed decisions on crucial matters.102 Thus,
states traditionally have age qualifications which restrict the funda-
mental right to vote, and which prohibit the sale of alcohol or
tobacco to minors. Contracts entered into by a minor which legally
obligate the minor are voidable, and minority is a disqualification
from participation in certain types of employment and from per-
formance of certain public functions. 03 Therefore, when the state
supports a parental right to make these decisions for the child, it
is pursuing the constitutionally permissible end of protecting the
minor from his own immaturity.
The problem with this argument, however, is that it was raised
and rejected by the Court in Danforth, and there is no reason to
believe that it would be any more compelling in a proceeding to
determine the religious rights of a child. Indeed, although it is a
at 323. See generally Kohlberg, Moral Education in the Schools: A Developmental
View, in S-umus iN ADoLEscENcE 237 (R. Grinder ed. 1969).
Many psychologists believe that it is this development which leads to increased
religious doubt and independent religious thought on the part of the adolescent.
As one commentator has written:
Increased intelligence with the accompanying ability to reason motivates
the adolescent to ponder over the religious beliefs he accepted so unques-
tioningly during childhood. With increased knowledge, especially that
derived from scientific studies in school, the adolescent views his childish
beliefs in a new light. Reasoning has been found to be the most important
single cause for changing religious attitudes and revising childish religious
beliefs.
E. HuRocx, AorscuTr DEvELoPmT 396 (1967). For many adolescents, this
independent thinking leads to a period of religious doubt, which often manifests
itself in the revision of religious beliefs. According to Hurlock,
[t]he adolescent should revise his religious concepts so that the beliefs
based on them will be meaningful and useful to him as he grows older.
Adolescents who are afraid to change their religious beliefs . . . because
of threats from authoritarian parents ... will find themselves as adults in
possession of religious beliefs that are no more in keeping with their new
status than clothing styled for a child.
ld. at 403 (footnotes omitted).
On the other hand, some experts have argued that the child's future autonomy
is best served by a general policy of state non-intervention in matters of parent-child
decision making, thus guaranteeing him a stable and secure family environment
where he will have the "opportunity on a continuing basis, not only to receive and
return affection but also to express anger and to learn to manage his aggression .... "
J. GornswmN, A. Fimun, & A. Som-T, BEYOND TnE BEST IzvrREss OF T E HMGM
5-6 (1973).
102 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 n.10 (1968).
103 See, e.g., 1 A. CoamiN, ConTR.crs § 6 (1963) (contracting restrictions);
1 Tim Cm nAND TnE STATE 315-57 (G. Abbot ed. 1938) (labor restrictions);
Wrsc. STAT. ANN. § 602 (West 1967); PA. CoNTs-. art 7, § 1; N.Y. Erxc. LAw
§ 150 (McKinney 1964) (voting restrictions); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 176.30 (West
1974); PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. 47, §4-493(1) (Pardon 1969); N.Y. PN.A LAw
§ 260.20 (McKinney 1967) (liquor restrictions).
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questionable value judgment to consider the abortion decision to be
more "important" than religious decisions, it might be said to
require a greater level of maturity than the sort of decision that a
child would usually desire to make in a dispute over his religious
preferences.104 As Justice Stewart noted in his concurring opinion
in Danforth, the decision to abort a pregnancy is "a grave decision,
and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-
equipped to make it without mature advice and emotional sup-
port." 105 Nevertheless, an independent privacy right of children
was recognized, and no parental veto was allowed. If the maturity
of the child passed muster in that context, it should hardly serve as
a bar in the religious context.
Some courts have already recognized that adolescent children
are sufficiently mature to meaningfully exercise the right to choose
among competing religious beliefs. This is reflected in a number
of decisions that have allowed children caught in the cross-fire of a
custody dispute to make their own choice on the issue of religion.
Thus in Hehman v. Hehman, a New York court ordered that a
dispute between parents as to a child's religious upbringing be re-
ferred to an official referee, who would interview the thirteen-year-
old boy to determine his own religious preference.100 The Court
noted the boy's age and the fact that he had been exposed to both
his parents creeds.10 7 Thus, the Hehman court concluded that the
decision should be left to the child, who could not "be forced to
enter a religion against his wishes." 108
A similar recognition of the competency of the child in these
matters was recognized by the New Jersey courts in Boerger v.
Boerger.109 In this case the appellate court gave approval to the
trial court's decision to interview a ten-year-old child to ascertain
her religious preference. The court stated that "[s]uch predilection,
104 One can, of course, posit a situation where a minor's free exercise of religion
would endanger his life (such as refusal of medical treatment) or lead him away
from the home. Both of these cases might warrant state intervention under the
"significant state interest" test announced in Carey. See text accompanying notes
147-51 infra.
105 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
106 13 Misc. 2d 318, 178 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
107 Id. at 321, 178 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
108 Id. Earlier, the court of appeals had affirmed, per curiam, a lower court
judgment that took a similar approach in resolving a parental dispute over the
religious upbringing of a child. Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d 812
(1954).
10926 N.J. Super. 90, 97 A.2d 419 (1953).
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when ascertained, is a factor that will be considered by the trial
court," in determining the religious issue in a custody dispute.110
In a more dramatic case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
recognized that children of sufficient age are often mature enough
to make meaningful religious decisions. In In re Green,1 the
Pennsylvania court was confronted with the question of whether
the state could order a sixteen-year-old boy to submit to medical
treatment over his mother's religiously based objection. The child
was suffering from a curvature of the spine, which seriously impaired
his physical well being, but did not threaten his life." 2  The mother
was a Jehovah's Witness who believed that the Bible proscribed the
blood transfusions that would have been necessary had the surgery
been undertaken. 13 First the court ruled that "as between a parent
and the state, the state does not have an interest of sufficient magni-
tude outweighing a parent's religious beliefs when the child's life is
not immediately imperiled by his physical condition." 114 The court
then remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing
to determine the preference of the boy--particularly the question
whether he was a Jehovah's Witness-implying that if the child's
religious views did not prohibit blood transfusions, then, perhaps,
the state could order the surgery despite the mother's objections."15
Thus, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania realized that, even in
religious matters implicating important medical decisions, some
minors are capable of making rational, meaningful decisions.
Given that the Supreme Court has recognized a children's right
of privacy that to some extent protects a child's autonomy in making
decisions about abortion, there is no sound reason to deny minors
the right to free exercise of religion.
D. Parent v. Child
Recognition of an independent constitutional religious right
for children should not, except in a narrow category of cases,"16
1l Id. at 103, 97 A.2d at 426.
111448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
112 Id. at 340-41, 292 A.2d at 388.
11l Id.
"L4 Id. at 348, 292 A.2d at 392 (emphasis in original).
115 Id.
"6 The child's constitutional right is against state, not parental, interference.
Parental rights are thus not likely to be diminished by recognition of the child's
constitutional right unless the parent seeks state support in the control of the child.
Thus any parental effort to enlist the state's aid in, for example, barring the child
from school, may well be limited by the child's constitutional right. See notes 120,
121, 139 infra and accompanying text.
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conflict with the already established constitutionally protected right
of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children; for
the child's religious right, found in the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, is a right held only against government, not against indi-
viduals such as parents.117 Therefore, in most cases where parents,
acting as private individuals, restrict their children's religious activ-
ities, no constitutional issues are involved.118 The recognition of a
constitutionally recognized religious right of children does not give
children a shield against purely parental intereference with their
religious exercise; children will have to continue to rely on state
protection of their religious interests as against their parents, and
of course any state efforts to vindicate these interests are limited by
the parental constitutional rights recognized in Pierce and Yoder." 9
A case could arise if the state did seek to protect the religious rights
of minors. This conflict would be between the child's state-sup-
ported interest in religious freedom (not the child's constitutional
right) and the parents' constitutionally protected rights.
The parental religious rights recognized in Pierce and Yoder,
however, are also rights against government, not against private
individuals such as children. If parents seek state support in deter-
mining the religious upbringing of their children by asking for
state assistance in restraining a rebellious child from exercising his
religious beliefs in a way offensive to the parents, the state action
would be limited by the child's constitutional religious rights. The
resulting conflict would be between the parent's state-supported
interest in parental religious control and the child's constitutional
right. The recognition of constitutional religious rights of children
117 Private interference with use of state facilities raises potential constitutional
questions. In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), six Justices were
prepared to find that a racially-animated conspiracy to deprive blacks of equal use
of state facilities was a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970), a penal statute
passed as an exercise of power granted to Congress under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment "to enforce, by appropriate legislation the provisions" of that amend-
ment. Id. 761 (Clark, J., concurring, joined by Black, J. and Fortas, J.); id. 774
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J. and Douglas, J.).
Given Guest, private interference with the use of state facilities, such as schools or
hospitals, is probably proscribable by Congress under § 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment Thus, the argument could be made that one of the civil rights acts passed
under the fourteenth amendment was intended to reach private interference with
religious freedom. See, e.g., Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971)
(purely private conspiracy to interfere with religious services a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3)). See note 140 infra.
-18 The state's involvement, however, need not be either exclusive or direct.
See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Therefore,
parents' sending their children to school under compulsion of state law would con-
stitute state action as to the children even if the law did not seek to penalize the
children for truancy. See also note 7 supra.
119 See text accompanying notes 37-54 supra.
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does not conflict with parental constitutional rights. Except in the
unusual case,120 the constitutional religious rights of children do
not collide with constitutionally protected religious rights of
others.
121
That recognition of constitutional religious rights for children
does not diminish constitutional parental rights does not mean,
however, that this recognition will not to some extent reduce
parental authority. The recognition of children's religious rights
would be a constitutional restraint on the support the state can lend
parents in restraining their children's religious activity. Moreover,
as Danforth makes clear, state legislation delegating a child's re-
ligious decision-making to parents might be subject to constitutional
attack. 22
Arguably, this incidental reduction of parental autonomy will
be desirable in most of the cases in which it occurs. The notion of
a parental right to raise children is based on the premise that it will
promote those goals society values in the upbringing of a child:
physical, emotional, psychological and intellectual development.
Where, however, the exercise of parental authority threatens to stifle
the intellectual and moral development of the child, as might be
the case if a parent constantly interferes with the child's religious
beliefs and practices, it is reasonable to ask whether the state might
not better serve the child's "best interests," and society's goals, by
refusing to invoke legal sanctions in support of parental authority.
When the parents "threaten the autonomous growth and expression
of [family] members ...1" 123 there is no longer any sound reason
to continue to support the family's authority. For at that point the
family is interfering with the child's ability to develop individual
autonomy and diversity of thought, the values underlying both the
120 1f a state hospital offers medical aid to a child, and this treatment is con-
trary to the parents' religious tenets, the parents' constitutional rights are probably
involved. Cf. Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich.), vacated without
opinion, 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1977) (distribution of contraceptives by county
health officials without parental consent violates parents' constitutional rights). If
the hospital refuses to treat the child merely because of the parents' religious objec-
tions, this is an imposition upon the child of the parents' religious belief, constituting
state action-or, more properly, inaction-arguably involving the child's constitu-
tionally-protected free exercise right.
121 Therefore, in most cases the conflict will be between constitutional right
and individual interest, cf. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (first amendment
right to free speech in conflict with individual's interest in personal reputation)
rather than a conflict between constitutional rights, ef. Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (conflict between first amendment freedom of the
press and sixth amendment right to fair trial).
122 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
123 Tribe, supra note 7, at 35 n.85.
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first amendment and the "best interest of the child" doctrine. More-
over, in most cases in which parents seek state support for their
efforts to restrain their child's religious activities, the family is
already in a state of breakdown and intervention on behalf of the
parent to vindicate a notion of parental supremacy seems of little
value. 2
4
In the case where parental authority is presently joined with
state action to prevent the child from exercising his religious rights
in such a way as to palbably endanger his well being, the recogni-
tion of a religious Tight for children would not mean that the child
would be allowed to injure himself irreparably. Danforth only
proscribed the delegation to the parents of an arbitrary veto on the
child's rights; the Court implied that the state retains a great deal
of leeway in exercising authority over children. Therefore, con-
sistent with Danforth, states may delegate some authority to the
parents, or, in the proper case, offer them affirmative aid in control-
ling the activity of their children, even when constitutional liberties
are involved.125  Carey, moreover, translates the Danforth implica-
tion into the formula that the state may proscribe constitutionally-
protected activities of children if it has "any significant state in-
terest" in doing so "that is not present in the case of adults," 126 a
test that should be met in the case of a child posing a danger to him-
self which would result in irreparable harm.
IV. DEVELOPING A WORKABLE STANDARD
If children have constitutionally protected religious rights, an
inquiry into their precise nature and scope is necessary. Particu-
larly in those cases where the state is acting to support parental
authority, and the interests of parents collide with the constitutional
rights of children, a very sensitive balancing approach is required.
Precisely such a balancing was undertaken by the Court in
Danforth and later clarified in Carey. The Court in Danforth
124 Some observers have argued that state intervention in parent-child matters
should be limited to egregious cases of family breakdown. Too much intervention
on behalf of either parent or child, they argue, will inevitably interfere with the
family's ability to function as a socializing and educational tool, and as a mechanism
which gives the child a sense of belonging and identity. Thus, Goldstein, Freud
and Solnit have expressed their "preference for privacy": "[to safeguard the right
of parents to raise their children as they see fit, free of government intrusion, except
in cases of neglect and abandonment, is to safeguard each child's need for con-
tinuity." J. Cornsrnm, A. FrxuD, & A. Sor,,rr, BtYO',ID n Bzr INTE s OF
THE Crm= 7 (1973).
125 428 U.S. at 72-75. See id. 91 (Stevart, J., concurring).
12G 431 U.S. at 693.
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struck down a statutory provision that completely removed the right
from the child, but it left open the possibility that a state could
adopt provisions that vested some limited decision-making authority
in the parent. 27 Justice Stewart suggested that a statute that in
most cases required parental consultation or consent, but allowed
the minor the right to establish that she was mature enough mean-
ingfully to exercise her right, might well be constitutional.
28
A religious free exercise right might take on similar character-
istics. Given the state's traditionally greater latitude in regulating
the conduct of children,129 the young child's lesser experience in
making important decisions,8 0 and the fundamental interest of the
parents in controlling the upbringing of children over whom they
have custody, 181 the child's right to free exercise would not always
be preferred over the right of his adult parent to direct his upbring-
ing. The underlying presumption might be that the course of
religious action a child takes must be determined for the child by
the parents early in the child's life; but as the child matures and
approaches majority, he must be allowed to participate to an in-
creasingly greater degree in the framing of the religious decisions
that concern him. In each case the court would have to inquire as
to the maturity of the child: age would be relevant, as would the
child's emotional and intellectual capacity. This might require the
judge to examine the child to determine whether he or she under-
stands the nature of the proposed free exercise activity and its
probable consequences. The court would also independently assess
the character of the activities to determine whether engaging in
them would threaten the child's health, safety or welfare. Finally,
the court would have to assess the validity of the parental objection
and the validity of the state's decision to vindicate the parents'
position.
To minimize the amount of judicial intervention, this inquiry
should perhaps take on some objective characteristics. It has been
strenuously argued that the law does not have "the capacity to
supervise the delicately complex interpersonal bonds between parent
and child," because it lacks "the capacity to deal on an individual
basis with the consequences of its decisions [and] to act with the
deliberate speed required by a child's sense of time essential to his
127428 U.S. at 75.
128 See id. at 91 (Stewart, J., concurring).
129 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
130 See generally Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
131 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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well being." 132 Thus, the law "must limit the state to determining
by some relatively objective standard who is entitled to decide, not
what specific decision is to be preferred in a particular case nor
whether a specific child has the 'wisdom' to make a choice." 133
Another argument in favor of developing objective criteria is that
they would establish for each child, with some degree of certainty,
the extent to which he enjoys constitutional rights and the situations
in which these rights may be exercised. A degree of certainty is
necessary if the various actors within the family unit are to perform
their socially accepted roles:
Children have many special needs that must be met in
their quest for maturity and independence. The most
critical of these needs is a satisfactory and permanent psy-
chological relationship with their parents. . . . If there is
insecurity or lack of commitment in the relationship, either
because of governmental intrusion or because a parent has
substantial doubts about the extent of his other personal
authority, serious psychological deficiencies are more likely
to exist in the relationship. 3 4
If objective criteria are developed by the courts, some semblance
of certainty is maintained, even if the degree of certainty is less
than that which exists where there is an irrebutable presumption in
favor of parental authority.
Perhaps a specific age could be selected below which there
would be a rebuttable but heavy presumption against religious free
exercise. Sixteen has been suggested in the context of medical
decisions,'- and might be applicable in the present context as well,
although some religious free exercise decisions pose far fewer risks,
and therefore demand a lower maturity level, than medical choices.
In addition, there could be a presumption in favor of certain activi-
132 Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of
Parental Autonomy, 86 YAmr L.J. 645, 650 (1977). Goldstein continues:
The right to partial emancipation should not rest on satisfying on a case-
by-case basis, some body of wise persons that the particular child is
"mature enough" to choose or that the particular child's choice is "right".
To introduce such a subjective process for decision would not be to
emancipate the child but rather to transfer to the state the parental control
and responsibility for determining when to consult and abide by the child's
choice.
Id. 662-63 (footnotes omitted).
133 Id. 663.
134 Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reserve-
tions About Abandoning Youth to Their Rights, 1976 B.Y. L. REv. 605, 651. See
also J. GoLsTum, A. FAEuD & A. SOLmrr, BEYOND THE BEST IRMSTS Or FH
CHL D 13 (1973).
135 Goldstein, supra note 132, at 663.
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des and against others. Those free exercise choices that would free
the child from the home might be disfavored given the strong social
belief that optimal child development is best achieved when the
parent-child relationship is maintained. Moreover, the lifelong
effects of binding, childish choices made while outside the influence
of the home may create permanent deprivations far more detri-
mental than the temporary limitations upon freedom inherent in a
refusal to allow the child to completely sever ties. Where, however,
the child's desire to leave the home is tearing the parent-child rela-
tionship apart, one might question whether maintaining the rela-
tionship under stress will really promote any of these socially
desired goals. There might also be a presumption against religious
free exercise choices within a medical context involving life or death.
While recognizing that many minors have the capacity meaningfully
to make some religious decisions, those that involve the ultimate
decision whether to live or to die may be beyond the capacity of
even the most mature minor. In addition, denying the minor this
choice still leaves open a wide range of other choices and does not
ultimately interfere with his freedom to explore new ideas-a value
at the heart of the free expression guarantees. 186
The above considerations help resolve some of the difficult
questions left after Yoder and Danforth. Consider, for exmpIe,
a fourteen-year-old child of Amish parents who desires to remain in
school, claiming that he does not share his parents' Amish faith.
The child attempts to attend school, but is prevented from entering
by school administrators, who have been convinced by the parents
that to educate the child contrary to the parents' religious belief
constitutes state interference with rights recognized in Pierce and
Yoder. The child sues to enjoin the school from preventing him
from attending, asserting that the school is interfering with his first
amendment religious rights by imposing upon him the religious
practices of his parents.'3 7 The child can couple this free exercise
claim with an argument stressing the importance of education in
maximizing his intellectual potential and future autonomy. 38  The
child's decision, though contrary to his parents' religious prefer-
ences, does not endanger his health, safety or welfare, and does not
require him to leave the home. In addition, ordering the school
13 6 See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
137 It is just this kind of imposition that Justice Douglas warned of in Yoder:
"[1]f the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable effect
is to impose the parents' notions of religious duty upon their children." 406 U.S.
205, 241-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
13 8 See generally Knudsen, The Education of the Amish Child, 62 CAL. L. TEv.
1506 (1974).
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to admit the child does not interfere greatly with the constitutional
rights of the parents.139 The court is not affirmatively decreeing
anything with respect to the parents; it is simply preventing the
public school from denying the child admittance based on the
parents' religious preferences. The decree does not in any way
compel the parents to do anything, and if the parents were adamant
about the child's not attending, they could themselves restrain him
from going to school, probably without implicating constitutional
rights.
140
A reversal of the above facts creates a more complicated dispute.
Suppose that a fourteen-year-old child, in accordance with his
religious beliefs, wishes to discontinue his schooling, over his
parents' objections. If he refuses to attend school and is brought
before a juvenile court judge as a truant, he can argue with force
that the state would be penalizing the exercise of his constitutional
139 The alleged interference with parental rights in those cases in which the
state merely offers the child a service, and does not in any way compel either parent
or child to accept the services, see, e.g., Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D.
Mich.), vacated without opinion, 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1977), is certainly a
more tenuous infringement upon those rights than the interference caused by laws
compelling or restricting parental behavior. Indeed it could be argued that because
the state's offer of services merely encourages a certain activity, without penalizing
an alternative protected activity, there is no constitutional concern at all. Cf.
Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977) (state encouragement of childbirth, through
funding, not infringement of right to abortion).
140 If the parents themselves were to physically restrain the child, the child
might then be without a remedy. He could sue his parents under state tort law
alleging that the parents were unlawfully restraining the child. But, a state court
might well dismiss the complaint, if the state's tort laws have either never recog-
nized children's suits against parents or have given the parents wide discretion.
See W. PaossER, LAw OF TORTS 866-67 (1971). Faced with such an adjudication,
the child would be forced to argue that the state, by refusing to extend tort law
protection to him, is denying him equal protection of the law, reasoning that his
parents could not have restrained an adult neighbor from attending school without
becoming liable in tort. His claim would stand or fall on whether he could sustain
a claim that such a classification based on his status as a minor-child is an imper-
missible one for equal protection purposes. See text accompanying notes 144-45
infra.
Alternatively, in his attempt to free himself from parental restraint, the child
could assert that his right to free exercise of religion was held against private indi-
viduals as well as government. See Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1234-35
(8th Cir. 1971) (holding that in passing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) Congress was exer-
cising its power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment and intended to prohibit
purely private conspiracies to interfere with the free exercise of religion). See
note 117 supra. This, though, is a controversial contention, not likely to prevail.
Note also that when private individuals interfere with access to state facilities the
state action analysis becomes particularly complicated. See United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745 (1966), discussed in note 117 supra.
Yet another approach has been suggested by Professor Tribe, who believes that
a state's inaction with respect to the parental disciplinary measures is sometimes
state action interfering with the child's constitutional rights: "[w]hen a family is in
disintegration or at the threshold of collapse . .. then it seems wrong to exonerate
the state of responsibility for such coercive parental measures as it permits even by
its inaction." Tribe, supra note 7, at 12 n.13.
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religious rights by imposing truancy sanctions on him. Pitted
against his position are the state's interest in educating its youth
to assure their intellectual development and his parents' interest
in controlling his upbringing. On the one hand, it seems that the
gravity of the decision to end one's education, coupled with the
parental control interest, is sufficiently "significant" to justify the
interference with the child's rights under the Carey formula.141
But, if the existence of the religious right is premised on a belief in
the ability of the child meaningfully to exercise it, then why should
the child be denied free exercise on these facts, when a similar
balancing in Yoder upheld the parent's free exercise rights? Of
course, the case of a child's seeking a complete termination of his
education is an extreme one. Imagine, then, a situation in which
the child does not seek a total exemption from school, but rather
an exemption once a week in order to observe a religious sabbath
that falls on a weekday. In such a case, the possible effect of the
limited absence on the child's overall welfare is more tenuous and
his request for relief more compelling. If the request were made
in good faith, it would seem to be one that should be respected.
As for the adolescent who refuses on 'religious grounds to
attend the sectarian school in which his parents have enrolled him
and is brought before a juvenile judge as an "incorrigible" child,
the case turns on whether the parents can assert an interest strong
enough to justify affirmative state intervention where the neces-
sary effect is to hold the child in violation of a state statute for
having done no more than to freely exercise his religious conscience.
Where the child is an adolescent, and has not deserted the home,
there seems to be no "significant" interest served by state inter-
vention on the parents' behalf. The child remains willing to attend
school-albeit not the one of his parents' choosing-and is not at-
tempting to leave the home. Unless his actions are threatening
his health or safety there seems to be no argument supportive of
the state's right to become involved.
Where the child has left home entirely, either to join a religious
sect of his own choosing or because of a disagreement with his
parents about the religious viewpoints being imposed upon him, a
very difficult case is presented. Here the parental interest in re-
ceiving state support is stronger, for the parent could argue that al-
lowing the child's desertion would be a complete emasculation of
the parental interest in participating in the child's upbringing. The
state, moreover, could assert that the child's absence from home
141 See text accompanying note 126 supra.
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and from school will seriously impair his physical and mental health,
and that a decision to leave the home requires a higher level of
maturity than a child is presumed to have in cases involving less
important decisions. Nevertheless, there may be instances in which
the free exercise right of the child outweighs the parental and state
interests even though leaving home is entailed. An example might
be when the child is beyond the age of compulsory education and
is willing to relinquish his claims to parental financial support. 142
In a case in which the parents have chosen not to seek state
assistance but to use self-help measures instead, the issue becomes
whether the child can request that the state assist him in exercising
his religion free from parental interference. Thus, if parents re-
strain a child from attending religious services that his parents find
offensive, probably no constitutional issue is presented, and the
child is left with whatever religious autonomy from his parents that
the state has created. Regardless of the merits of his underlying
claim, the child must show that the state is interferring with his
rights; otherwise a constitutional issue does not arise. The child
could argue that private interference with religious rights gives rise
to a federal cause of action. This argument is without much force,
however, because the federal civil rights statutes enacted under the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments probably cannot be invoked
where the purely private interference is not racially motivated.143
Alternatively, he could sue his parents under a state tort law
alleging unlawful restraint, but it is difficult to see how the child's
constitutional religious rights play any role in a case of parental
self-help. If the state court dismissed the child's complaint because
the tort law does not recognize the unlawful restraint claims of
children against their parents, the child would have to argue that
denying an unlawful restraint remedy against his parents, while
routinely granting relief in other cases was a denial of the "equal
protection" of the laws. He could argue that the state's classifica-
tion of people to whom they will or will not grant relief in restraint
cases works to interfere with the free exercise rights of children.
The problem with this argument is that, under conventional state
action analysis, failure of the state to intervene in a child's religious
dispute with his parents does not constitute "state interference"
with the minor's right to freely exercise his religious beliefs.
144
142 See Tribe, supra note 7, at 12 n.13.
143 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). See also Wisconsin Nat'1
Org. for Women v. Wisconsin, 417 F. Supp. 978 (42 U.S.C. § 1981 not applicable
to sex discrimination). But see Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
144 Cf. Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977) (refusal of state to fund abortion
does not penalize privacy rights).
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Moreover, the state would argue that the classification of tort plain-
tiffs into two categories-(l) children bringing restraint cases against
their parents and (2) all other plaintiffs-is a rational classification,
established in part out of respect for parental constitutional rights.
Because children are not a "suspect class," 145 this classification
would probably be upheld, especially given the parents fundamental
right that would become involved if the state intervened. This does
not mean, of course, that state courts or state legislatures could not,
if they chose, protect children's right to free exercise of religion
against unreasonable parental restraint. The state interest in in-
suring mature children the right to attend religious services of their
choice is probably sufficient to overcome the parental rights recog-
nized in Pierce and Yoder.146 Certainly the state interest would
override any parental child-rearing right in the case of extreme
forms of restraint or cruelty. But the delineation of the scope which
the religious rights of children should be accorded by the state is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
- The medical cases present interesting problems. One possible
case is raised if the child has been refused treatment at a hospital
because his parents, for religious reasons, have failed to give the
consent required by state law.147 The child sues, seeking to enjoin
the hospital from denying him admittance, on the ground that the
state, through its parental consent requirement, is forcing him to
live according to the religious beliefs of his parents. If the child
is sufficiently mature to understand the possible benefits and risks
of the surgery,148 and if the statute delegates to his parents a "reli-
gious veto" over the medical treatment, it probably impermissibly
infringes upon his first amendment rights. Here the parents cer-
tainly have an interest in the child's adherence to their religious
faith and may also have an interest in guarding against any treat-
ment that might increase their liability for the support and mainte-
145 See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
146 The Yoder Court expressly did not confront such a situation. 406 U.S. at
232. See also notes 4 & 5 supra.
147 In most jurisdictions, minor children are considered incapable of consenting
to surgical care and the invasion of the person of the child by a physician will be
a technical battery unless the consent of the parent has been received. See Bonner
v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (15 year-old child); Zoski v. Gaines,
271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935) (99 year-old child); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 10101-10105 (Purdon 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.061 (Vernon Cum. Supp.
1977). But see Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (18 year-old child).
148 Some courts have reasoned that some minors are sufficiently mature to give
effective consent to medical treatment. See W. Pnosssa, LAw or ToRTs 103 n.51
(1971).
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nance of the child. 149 But where the balance of benefit and harm
favor surgery and the child seems sufficiently mature to understand
the balance, his request that the application of the consent statute
be enjoined should be granted.
An equally difficult case is presented where a minor who be-
longs to a religious sect that prohibits medical treatment, sues to
enjoin a state hospital from going ahead with surgery that his
parents want him to have. If the surgery is aimed at correcting a
condition that is arguably interfering with the child's ability to lead
a "normal" lifestyle, but is not threatening his life, there is a strong
case for vindicating the child's religious rights, especially if the
child is not only sufficiently mature meaningfully to exercise the
religious belief, but is also able to appreciate the serious conse-
quences of his medical decision. Despite the fact that the parental
interest in making these decisions is strong, when the decision to be
made concerns surgery to correct a defect which is not life threaten-
ing, the issue is much akin to a lifestyle choice, and the child's
autonomy should be respected.50 Where, however, the failure to
provide surgical care entails the likelihood of death, the child's case
is weakest. In such an instance there is authority for the proposi-
tion that, even if an adult were asserting the religiously-based objec-
tion, the state's interest in the preservation of human life justifies a
court order for compulsory treatment.151 The condition of infancy
only strengthens the case for overriding the child's religious rights.
Not only does the state have an interest in protecting life, but, in
this case, the parents' interest in the upbringing of the child is com-
pletely negated if the child is allowed to choose to die. Of course,
this discussion presupposes that the risk of death from surgery is
less than the risk of death if treatment is foregone. Where, how-
ever, the proposed treatment itself poses a great risk of death, the
case for vindicating the child's rights is stronger.
Finally, there are the custody cases. If the court includes in
the decree a provision dealing with the religious upbringing of the
child, it should follow the guide of the New York and New Jersey
courts, -52 which inquire into, and often give effect to, the preference
of a mature child. The recognition of first amendment religious
rights for minors would call for at least this type of inquiry.
149 See Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956), noted in 10
V"-.D. L. REv. 619 (1957).
150 See Goldstein, supra note 132, at 664.
151 See Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
152 See text accompanying notes 106-10 supra.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined the extent to which minors enjoy
the guarantees of the first amendment's free exercise clause inde-
pendent of their parents. With particular emphasis on those in-
stances in which a child's religious preferences run contrary to those
of the parent, it has examined the evolution of parental authority
in these matters, and the developing recognition of independent
children's rights. With the guidance of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Danforth and Carey, it has suggested that, in a proper
proceeding, the Supreme Court would now recognize that children
enjoy some right to determine the character of their religious up-
bringing. That right would necessarily be a qualified one, subject
to state interference and state-sanctioned parental interference on
a lesser showing than would be required to justify interference with
the religious rights of adults. But it would be a recognized right
nonetheless.
In determining the scope of the right, and its application in
particular cases, it has been suggested that the courts would have to
look to the totality of the circumstances that underlie the minor's
claim, including age, maturity level, and the character of the pro-
posed religious exercise, in addition to the basis for any state or
parental objection. When an older, more mature child is con-
cerned, the presumption would favor his free exercise; the presump-
tion would be reversed in the case of a younger, less mature minor.
The growing emphasis on protecting children's rights, both in
the procedural and substantive arena, makes it likely that courts
willbe presented with issues implicating children's religious liberty;
it is hoped that courts will afford these rights the constitutional
respect they deserve by not summarily disregarding them merely
because they are asserted by children.
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